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The Reporter's Shield Privilege Is Alive and
Well in Missouri
State ex rel. ClassicHI, Inc. v. Ely'
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution2 and an analogous
provision in the Missouri Constitution3 guarantee individuals the freedom of
speech and freedom of the press, among other things. But do these guarantees
enable a reporter to withhold the identities of individuals who provided
information in confidence in the face of a legitimate civil discovery request?
This question confronted the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals
in State ex rel. ClassicIII, Inc. v. Ely.
In a case of first impression in Missouri, the court upheld a reporter's right
to withhold the identities of confidential sources-also known as the reporter's
shield privilege-under these circumstances. This privilege is not absolute, as
the court explained, but instead, is qualified. Its recognition is contingent upon
the proper evaluation of competing interests, namely the public's interest in the
free flow of information versus a libel plaintiff s right to prosecute a legitimate
claim.4

1. 954 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
2. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom ofspeech, or of thepress; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress ofgrievances." U.S. CoNST. amend. I (emphasis
added).
3. Article I, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution reads:
[N]o law shall be passed impairing thefreedom of speech, no matter by what
means communicated; that every person shall be free to say, write orpublish,
or otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being responsible
for all abuses of that liberty; and that in all suits and prosecutions for libel or
slander the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in suits and
prosecutions for libel the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine
the law and the facts.
Mo. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added).

4. In Missouri, a libel plaintiff who is neither a public official nor a public figure,
as were the plaintiffs in Classic III, must plead and prove that: (1) the defendant
published the defamatory statement; (2) the defendant was at fault in publishing the
statement; (3) the statement tended to expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, and
ridicule; (4) the statement was read by other persons or by the public; and (5) the
plaintiff's reputation was thereby damaged. See Kennedy v. Jasper, 928 S.W.2d 395,
400 (Mo. Ct.App. 1996); MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCrIONS No. 23.06(1) (5th ed.
1996) [hereinafter MAI]. At common law, the tort of libel was subdivided into libel per
se and libel per quod. "[Libel] per se referred to a statement whose defamatory nature
was apparent upon the face of the publication, whereas [libel] per quod indicated a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Owner-Operator Independent Truck Drivers Association, Inc. and OwnerOperator Services, Inc. ("plaintiffs") filed a libel action against Classic Il, Inc.,
publisher of a monthly magazine entitled rpm, 6 and Carl Danbury, the
magazine's associate publisher ("relators").' Plaintiffs claimed that an article
written by Mr. Danbury, published in the April 1995 issue of rpm, contained
false and defamatory statements about the insurance practices of OwnerOperator Services, Inc.'
While performing research for the article, Mr. Danbury had a telephone
conversation with an individual who requested that his or her identity remain
confidential.9 Roxanne Campbell, editorial director ofrpm, also spoke with two
other individuals prior to publication of the article and promised to keep their
identities confidential as well.1" Following publication of the April 1995 issue,
Ms. Campbell solicited comments about the article from several individuals,
again subject to promises of confidentiality."
Via depositions and
interrogatories, plaintiffs sought to obtain the identities of these individuals. 2
Relators refused such attempts, claiming that the sources were promised
confidentiality and that their identities were protected by the reporter's shield

statement that required resort to extrinsic facts in order to become defamatory." Nazeri
v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993). The significance of this
distinction was that libel per se was actionable without proof of special damages, i.e., "a
loss of money or ofsome advantage capable of being assessed in monetary value," while
libel per quod generally required proof of special damages. Id. Recently in Missouri, the
supreme court abolished the common law rules of per se and per quod and required that
actual damages, i.e., "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering," be proven in all cases. Id. at 309
(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). Furthermore, Missouri
courts "now consider libel and slander under the single tort of defamation, while retaining
many of the common law characteristics of both." Kennedy, 928 S.W.2d at 399. See also
MAI No. 23.06(1), (2).
5. Owner-Operator Services, Inc., ("OOSI"), is a subsidiary of Owner-Operator
Independent Truck Drivers Association, Inc., ("OOIDA"), and provides insurance to
OOIDA's members. State ex rel.,Classic lf, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997).
6. rpm is marketed to truck drivers. Id.
7. Id. at 652.
8. Id. The article reported, among other things, that a former OOSI employee had
been indicted in Florida for fraud and racketeering. Id. at 651.
9. Id. at 652.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/6
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privilege. 13 Plaintiffs promptly filed a motion to compel relators to reveal the
names of the sources. 4
Plaintiffi did not dispute that relators promised their sources confidentiality,
but argued that such promises must yield to legitimate attempts to obtain
relevant evidence." The crux of plaintiffs' argument was that relators' lack of
reliance on the information gathered from the confidential sources precluded
recognition of the reporter's shield privilege. 6 Plaintiffs acknowledged that
numerous courts have recognized the reporter's shield, but argued that those
decisions were predicated on "the privilege's role in protecting the sources of
information used by the press in preparation and publication of news stories."' 7
From this, plaintiffs' reasoned that recognition of the reporter's shield is
inappropriate in situations where, as in this case, the media did not actually use
the information gathered from its confidential sources.' 8
The trial court agreed with plaintiffs, and ordered disclosure of the sources'
identities, believing such information likely to lead to the discovery of relevant
evidence. 9 Relators consequently sought a writ of prohibition from the Western
District of the Missouri Court of Appeals barring enforcement of the order.20
The court of appeals unanimously reversed the trial court and ordered the writ.2'
Although the court did not expressly state, it intimated that the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the Missouri
Constitution grant a reporter's shield privilege in civil cases where
confidentiality was promised. More specifically, the court held that a reporter's
shield privilege exists in civil actions in appropriate circumstances22 to protect

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 653. Relators conceded that they did not rely on the sources in preparing
the article. Id.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 652. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(1) permits parties to obtain discovery of
information which is relevant or "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible (i.e., relevant) evidence." (emphasis added).
20. State ex rel. Classic m],
Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
The court of appeals agreed that prohibition was the proper remedy because it enabled
determination of the applicability of the asserted privilege. Id. at 652-53.
21. Id. at 651.
22. The existence of "appropriate circumstances" depends upon the application of
a four-factor balancing test adopted by the court to determine whether recognition of the
reporter's shield privilege is warranted. This test requires a court to determine: (1)
whether the party seeking discovery has exhausted alternative sources ofthe information;
(2) the importance of protecting confidentiality in the circumstances of the case; (3)
whether the information sought is crucial to the plaintiffs case; and (4) whether the
plaintiff has made a prima facie case of defamation. Id. at 655. The court's application
of this test is discussed infra Part IV.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 6
1032

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 63

a publisher from being forced to reveal the identities of confidential sources
where confidentiality was in fact promised, regardless of whether the
information obtained from such sources was relied on in preparing an allegedly
libelous article.'

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A reporter first claimed a shield privilege based on the free speech and
press clauses of the First Amendment in Garland v. Torre.14 Garland,like
Classic11, involved a defamation action in which a reporter refused to reveal
the identities of confidential sources of information in a deposition.' The
Second Circuit rejected the notion that the First Amendment permitted the
reporter to withhold information sought in a legitimate discovery request.26 The
court reasoned that "the duty of a witness to testify in a court of law has roots
fully as deep in our history as does the guarantee of freedom of the press," and
concluded that the public's interest in the free flow of information was
tantamount to its interest in the "fair administration ofjustice."'
Since Garland,courts have evaluated the propriety of the reporter's shield
privilege in three main contexts: grand jury proceedings, criminal proceedings,
and civil proceedings. In each of these contexts, as in Garland,the decision
whether to recognize the shield privilege has involved a balancing of competing
interests, pitting the First Amendment's guarantee of the free flow of
information to the public against other important societal interests (which are
generally specific to the particular context in which the privilege is raised).
A. GrandJury Proceedings
In Branzburgv. Hayes,2" the United States Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment does not enable reporters to withhold the identities of
confidential sources or the information they provide from federal or state grand
juries.29 Although the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the First
Amendment arguments in favor of the privilege, 0 it determined that they were

23. ClassicIII, 954 S.W.2d at 653.
24. 259 F.2d 545 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
25. Id. at 547. Garlandalso involved a breach of contract claim, in addition to the
libel claim. Id.
26. Id. at 548.
27. Id. at 548-49.
28. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
29. Id. at 689, 709.
30. "We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the
country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First
Amendment protection. .. ." Id. at 681. 'The argument that the flow of news will be
diminished by compelling reporters to aid the grand jury in a criminal investigation is not
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/6
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insufficient to counterbalance those arguments against the privilege, namely the
public's interest in the prevention and prosecution of crime.31 The Court found
support for its holding in the fact that such a privilege did not exist at common
law as well as the fact that commentators have historically disfavored the
creation of new testimonial privileges.32 The Court also emphasized that it has
never invalidated every limited burden on First Amendment rights, such as those
involved in Branzburg.33 Moreover, the Court explained that the First
Amendment does not grant the press any greater privileges than it grants average
citizens, and that just as the First Amendment does not immunize average
citizens from grand jury interrogation, neither does it immunize the press.'
Despite its holding, the Court emphasized that neither Congress nor state
legislatures were prevented from statutorily enacting a reporter's shield
privilege, nor were state courts prevented from interpreting their respective
constitutions to confer such a privilege.3"
CBS Inc. (KMOX-TV) v. Campbell" was the first Missouri case to address
the reporter's shield privilege in any context. The Eastern District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals held that the Missouri Constitution did not provide
a shield privilege in grand jury proceedings.3" The court reasoned: .'It is the
solemn and important duty that every citizen owes to his country,' to testify in
a grand jury proceeding 'against offenders, against the peace and good order of
the community."' 38 The court also found comfort in the fact that the "secrecy of

irrational, nor are the records before us silent on the matter." Id. at 693. The Court
concluded, however, that the notion that refusal to recognize a reporter's shield privilege
would undermine the guarantee of freedom of the press "is not the lesson history teaches
us." Id. at 698. The Court noted that the common law recognized no such privilege, and
furthermore that the press had operated, and flourished, in this country for nearly two
centuries without one, as no such privilege had even been argued until Garlandin 1958.
Id. at 698-99.
31. Id. at 695. The Court determined that reporters' concerns are protected to the
extent that grand jury proceedings must be conducted in good faith. Id. at 707. "Official
harassment of the press undertaken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a
reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no justification." Id. at 707-08.
32. Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665, 685, 690 n.29 (1972). The Court relied on
Wigmore, among others, in stating that testimonial privileges "obstruct the search for
truth." Id. at 690 n.29 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 681-82. "[T]hese cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly,
no prior restraint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or implied
command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold." Id. at 681.
34. Id. at 682-83.
35. Id. at 706.
36. 645 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
37. Id. at33.
38. Id. at 32 n.2 (quoting Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 80 (1829)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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the grand jury proceeding ameliorates the harmful effects of disclosure in an
ordinary civil or criminal trial. 39
The court emphasized, however, that its holding was limited to the facts of
the case.40 One of the limiting facts was the absence of a promise of
confidentiality. In reaching its decision, the court expressly stated that no claims
of confidentiality were involved, and it further identified several cases whose
recognition of the privilege in grand jury proceedings were contingent upon the
existence of a promise of confidentiality.4 A second potentially limiting fact
was the context in which the privilege was claimed-a grand jury proceeding.
The Campbell court noted other courts' general willingness to recognize the
privilege in civil and criminal proceedings but not in grand jury proceedings.42
These facts suggest that the Campbellcourt would have interpreted the Missouri
Constitution to confer the privilege had the case involved the promise of
confidentiality or had the privilege been asserted in a civil or criminal
proceeding.
B. CriminalProceedings
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any Missouri court has ever
determined the applicability of the reporter's shield privilege in a criminal
proceeding. However, courts that have done so have generally balanced the
public's interest in the free flow of information against the defendant's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to a fair trial and Sixth Amendment
right to confront adverse witnesses. 43 Generally, the defendant's due process and

39. Id. at 33.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 32.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146-47 (3d. Cir. 1980);
Far v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975).
The Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger;, nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, property,
without dueprocessoflaw, nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/6
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Sixth Amendment rights will preempt any First Amendment interests (i.e., the
privilege will be denied) if the confidential information sought is material or
relevant to the charged offense or to an asserted defense."
C. Civil Proceedings
The United States Supreme Court has determined the propriety of the
reporter's shield privilege in a civil proceeding on one occasion. In Herbert v.
Lando, the Court rejected reporters' claims that the First Amendment barred
a defamation plaintiff from inquiring into the editorial process. In this case, the
plaintiff was a public figure47 and thus was required to prove that the allegedly
defamatory statements were made with actual malice in accordance with the
Court's holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.41 The Court determined that

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without dueprocessof law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of its laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
The Sixth Amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
44. See United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the
moving party must make a "clear and specific" showing that the confidential documents
are highly relevant, necessary, or critical to the maintenance of the claim, and furthermore
that the information sought is not obtainable from other sources); United States v. Criden,
633 F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that disclosure of confidential sources requires
a showing of materiality, relevance, and necessity of the information, as well as
exhaustion of alternative sources); see also In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1992);
United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988); Romualdo P.
Eclavea, Annotation, Privilege of Newgatherer Against Disclosure of Confidential
Sources orInformation,99 A.L.R. 3d 37 (1980). Because there is no Supreme Court nor
Missouri case on point, this Note will not discuss in detail the status of the shield
privilege in criminal proceedings.
45. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
46. Id. at 158, 175. The Court implicitly defined editorial process as "internal
communications" between reporters and editors and a "reporter's conclusions about the
veracity of the material he has gathered." Id. at 171.
47. The plaintiff was a retired Army officer who had received "widespread media
attention" for accusing superior officers of concealing information regarding war crimes
and other atrocities. Id. at 155-56. The plaintiff conceded that he was a public figure.
Id. at 155-56.
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court held that in order for a
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 6

1036

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 63

inquiry into the editorial process was germane to proving the reporter's state of
mind-that such statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard
as to their veracity-and therefore must override the shield
49
privilege.

It must be noted that Lando involved no promises or claims of
confidentiality, nor did the Court discuss the relevance of confidentiality to its
holding. As such, Lando may plausibly be distinguished from cases like Classic
Iff in which confidentiality is established. Notwithstanding such a distinction,
the Court's decision in Lando is illustrative of its reluctance to enunciate that the
freedom of speech and freedom of press clauses of the First Amendment provide
the press with a privilege to withhold information in light of countervailing
interests.
Federal appellate courts have had eleven different occasions to determine
the applicability of a reporter's shield privilege in civil cases where promises of
confidentiality were involved. While none of these decisions recognize an
absolute privilege to withhold confidential information, all of them hold that a
shield privilege exists in certain circumstances, the determination ofwhich must
be made on a case-by-case basis.50

public official plaintiff to recover damages for a defamatory statement relating to his or
her official conduct, he or she must prove that the statement was made with actual malice,
in addition to proving other elements of state defamation claims. Id. at 279-80. Actual
malice is defined as the publication of a defamatory statement "with knowledge that it [is]
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
In CurtisPublishingCo. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court extended a similar
requirement to public figure plaintiffs, holding that a public figure could only recover
upon "a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible
publishers." Id. at 155. The Court has defined public figures as: (1) those who have
"general fame and notoriety in the community," i.e., are public figures for all purposes;
(2) those who have "voluntarily injected themselves into a public controversy in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved" and are public figures only with respect
to that controversy; and (3) "involuntary public figures" who are directly affected by the
actions of public officials. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
49. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979).
50. Clybum v. News World Communications, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Larouche v. National Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert.denied,479
U.S. 818 (1986); In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656
F.2d 705,713-14 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633
F.2d 583, 596-98 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721,725
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d
708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McKee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437-38 (10th
Cir. 1977); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Baker v. F & F. Inv.,
470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Cervantes v. Time,
Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 994.(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). See also
Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating various circumstances, to be
determined on a case-by-case basis, may mandate recognition of a reporter's shield
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/6
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D. Shield Laws
Recall that in Branzburg,the Supreme Court emphasized that its decision
did not preclude Congress or state legislatures from enacting statutory shield
privileges.5 In fact, by the time Branzburgwas announced in 1972, seventeen
states had already enacted some form of statutory protection of a reporter's
53
confidential sources.52 Since Branzburg,nine other states have followed suit.
To date, neither Congress nor the Missouri General Assembly have enacted
shield statutes of any kind.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In State ex rel. Classic I, Inc. v. Ely, the court held that, under appropriate
circumstances, a reporter's shield privilege exists in civil cases where sources
are promised confidentiality, regardless of whether those sources are relied on
in compiling the article.54 In determining whether appropriate circumstances
existed in this case, the court observed that other courts have generally focused
on the presence or absence of four factors: (1) whether the plaintiffs exhausted
alternative sources of information; (2) the importance of protecting
confidentiality in the circumstances of the case; (3) whether the information
sought is crucial to the plaintiffs' case; and (4) whether the plaintiffs established
a prima facie case of defamation." The court adopted this balancing test and
applied it to the facts of the instant case.56

privilege where the information sought is not confidential).
51. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972).
52. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1995); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.300 (Michie 1996);
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-2237 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1987); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8-901 (West 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Michie 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1452 (West 1982); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 9112 (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5(a) (West 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 4611-307 to -317 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21
(West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (Michie 1987); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney 1992); OmO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 2739.04, .12 (Anderson 1992); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 1983).
53. GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021 - .025 (West
1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to -147 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06-2
(1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540
(1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3 (1997); S.C. CODEANN. § 19-11-100 (Law Coop. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1997).
54. State ex rel. Classic I, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).

55. Id. at 655.
56. Id. The court emphasized that the balancing test is only to be applied where

confidentiality was promised to the reporter's sources. Id. Ifthe party seeking disclosure
disputes the claim of confidentiality, the trial court is to hold an evidentiary hearing to
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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A. Alternative Sources ofthe ConfidentialInformation
Recognition of the privilege requires "[t]he party seeking the information
[to] show that his only practical access to crucial information necessary for the
development of the case is through the newsman's source. [The] plaintiffls]
must show that they exhausted other means of obtaining the information.1 7 The
court noted that plaintiffs made no showing that they pursued alternative sources
of the information.58 As to the pre-publication sources, however, the court
opined that it would be difficult to find alternative sources of the information
supplied by such sources, as it was unlikely that anyone else would have similar
information. 9 As to the post-publication sources, the court believed alternative
sources of information did exist.6 "Assuming that the names may have potential
relevance to damages, it is evident that similar evidence of damages would be
available by contacting any of the thousands of truckers who read the
magazine."'6' Hence, as to post-publication sources, the court deemed the
existence of alterative sources of information to favor recognition of the shield
privilege.62
B. ImportanceofProtectingConfidentiality
The court's analysis of the second factor entailed a balancing of competing
interests. As the court noted:
The compelled disclosure of confidential sources . . . may

substantially undercut the public policy favoring the free flow of
information to the public that is the foundation for the privilege. 63 On
the other hand, if every assertion of confidentiality were to
automatically result in a denial of any discovery, then a libel
plaintiff's right to discover information which is relevant to his or her
claim could also be unduly restricted.'

resolve this factual issue. Id.

57. Id. at 656 (quoting Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716-17 (3d Cir.
1979)).
58. Id.
59. Id. Curiously, the court did not elaborate on whether such a fact favored
recognition of the privilege. Logic dictates that it would not favor recognition of the
privilege, at least as to the pre-publication sources.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. See supra text accompanying note 59.
63. State ex rel. Classic 1Il, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
(quoting Cuthbertson v. CBS, Inc., 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980)).
64. Id. Given these competing interests, the court felt it imperative that the
legitimacy of the claim of confidentiality be established before the interests are balanced.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/6
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After weighing these competing interests, the court concluded that this
factor favored recognition of the privilege." The court emphasized that the risk
to the free flow of information to the public was especially high in the instant
case because of the magazine's limited audience base.6 The court noted that
rpm is a magazine for truckers, read by truckers, and that truckers are frequently
the sources of information for articles.6 7 The court concluded that forcing
relators to reveal the names of their sources would seriously undercut their
credibility, thereby hindering their ability to gather information,
and ultimately
68
their ability to disseminate information to the public.
C. Whether the Information is Crucialto the Plaintiffs' Case
The court's evaluation of the third factor stemmed from its belief that
[i]f the confidential source is relied on for an essential point of libel in
the article, then the need to identify and question the source is of
central importance. By contrast, where the information provided by
the source is only of peripheral or collateral importance, then the need
for discovery is less strong and the importance of the promise of
confidentiality looms larger. 69
It was undisputed that relators did not actually use or rely on the three prepublication sources, from which the court concluded that the information
gathered from those sources could not have been relied on for an essential point
of libel. 71 The court also noted that nothing revealed by post-publication sources
could ever be relied on for a point of libel. 7' These conclusions led the court to
determine
that this factor favored application of the privilege in the instant
72
case.

This determination did not however dispose of the court's analysis of this
factor. Plaintiffs argued that because relators did not rely on anything said by
their sources, no privilege should attach at all. 73 Plaintiffs contended that such
persons could not be sources by definition and that the privilege should

Id. Such a determination was not necessary in the instant case because relators' claim of
confidentiality had not been contested. Id. at 652.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 656-57.
.67. Id. at 657.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 657-58.
70. Id. at 658.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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automatically not apply.74 The court rejected this argument primarily because
its acceptance "would turn the traditional test for determining privilege on its
head." Acceptance of plaintiffs' proposition would produce the absurd result of
precluding from discovery sources of information crucial to a libel plaintiff's
case, if such sources were relied on in the preparation of an allegedly libelous
article, while subjecting sources of peripheral information to potential discovery
precisely because they were not relied on.' Such a result would contradict the
result intended by this factor. Moreover, the court believed that the information
gathered from the confidential sources, if not directly relied on in writing the
article, may well have been used as background in developing non-confidential
sources or retained for future use.76
The court additionally noted plaintiffs' inability to cite any authority for its
argument, and further identified decisions of other courts rejecting it.77 Finally,
the court concluded that its line of reasoning as to this issue was consistent with
that applied by Missouri courts in protecting attorney work-product from
discovery in cases other than the one for which the product was created.78
D. Strength ofthe Case
As to the fourth factor, the court explained:
If the case is weak, then little purpose will be served by allowing such
discovery, yet great harm will be done by revelation of privileged
information .... On the other hand, if a case is strong.., then the balance
may swing
in favor of discovery if the harm from such discovery is not too
79
severe.
The court withheld analysis of this factor due to the limited record before
it."0 Such lack of analysis was of no consequence to the court's ultimate
decision, however, as the other factors strongly favored recognition of the
privilege."'
V. COMMENT
It is difficult to say whether the ClassicHI court's recognition of a qualified
reporter's shield privilege was appropriate in this case. Such a determination
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 660.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/6

12

19981

Fehlig: Fehlig: Reporter's Shield Privilege Is Alive and Well in Missouri
REPORTER'S SHIELD PRIVILEGE

1041

depends on the countervailing interests at stake. The ClassicIII court assumed
that the identities of relators' confidential sources were relevant to damages.82
Although this assumption is correct, the court did not specify whether this
relevance pertained to compensatory damages, to punitive damages, or to both.
Indeed, this distinction is crucial to a proper identification of competing interests
and, hence, a correct determination of whether a qualified or an absolute shield
privilege should apply.
If the countervailing interest is a private defamation plaintiff's right to
prosecute a legitimate claim and thereby repair undue damage to his reputation,
such an interest precludes an absolute privilege and alternatively requires a caseby-case analysis to determine when the privilege should prevail and when it
should yield.83 On the other hand, if the countervailing interest is merely a
private plaintiff's desire to impose punitive damages, the privilege should
therefore be absolute, as such a competing interest can never override those in
favor of the privilege. This Comment will examine the relevance of confidential
sources to compensatory and punitive damages and will further delineate the
type of reporter's shield privilege-qualified or absolute-that should apply
relative to the type of damages at issue.
A. The Relevance of ConfidentialSources to CompensatoryDamages
Any award of damages, whether compensatory or punitive, requires
satisfaction of various threshold factors. In Missouri, a defamed plaintiff is
entitled to compensatory damages of "such sum ... as will fairly and justly
compensate the plaintiff for any damages... he sustained as a direct result" of
the defamatory statement.' This award, of course, is dependent upon the
plaintiff establishing the existence of all of the elements of Missouri's
defamation claim." Proving fault on the part of the defendant is perhaps the
most difficult element to satisfy.86 Often, knowledge of the defendant's source
82. See State ex rel. Classic I, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997) (assuming that the names may have potential relevance to damages).
83. The analysis and propositions contained in this Note pertain only to cases
involving a private defamation plaintiff, as in ClassicHI. This Note does not purport to
extend its analysis to the public official or public figure plaintiff arena.
84. Kennedy v. Jasper, 928 S.W.2d 395, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting MAI
No. 4.15). Compensatory damages include actual or general damages "imposed for the
purpose of compensating the plaintiff for the harm that the publication caused to his
reputation," special damages for "the loss of something having economic or pecuniary
value," and damages for emotional distress and bodily harm. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (1976).
85. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
86. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. at 323.
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may be the only evidence indicative of fault. For example, a reporter's reliance
on sources of questionable credibility or veracity in compiling an allegedly
defamatory article could constitute the requisite level of fault. If the reporter
relied exclusively on these sources in publishing the article, there would be no
other way for the plaintiff to prove fault except through knowledge of these
sources.
On the other hand, punitive damages may be awarded in Missouri "for
conduct that is outrageous, because of defendant's evil motive and reckless
indifference to the rights of others. ' 7 In the defamation context, a showing of
actual malice satisfies this standard.88 Knowledge of the identities of
confidential sources will often be the only way to prove actual malice, since the
credibility of these sources, as gleaned from knowledge of their identities, is
highly indicative of whether the alleged defamatory statement was published
with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard as to its veracity. 9
B. The Proprietyof the Privilege When Fault is at Issue
If a private plaintiff contends that ascertainment of the identities of
confidential sources is necessary to prove fault, the privilege should not be
absolute; rather, the competing interests should be balanced because they are
equally strong. Although the right of a reporter to withhold the identities of
confidential sources is undoubtedly an interest subsumed by the First
Amendment, it does not command the full panoply of that amendment's
protection. The compelled disclosure of confidential sources "involve[s] no
intrusion-] upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on what the
press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish
what it prefers to withhold." 90 As such, the reporter's shield privilege's First
Amendment protection is not impenetrable by a strong countervailing interest.
Indeed, a strong countervailing interest lies in the reparation of undue
damage to a person's reputation as a result of a defamatory statement, a function
87. Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979)). "Punitive damages are not a matter of right but

rest in the discretion of the trier of fact." Kennedy, 928 S.W.2d at 401.
88. A showing of actual malice, while not required by a plaintiff who is neither a
public official nor a public figure, may give rise to punitive damages. Kennedy, 928
S.W.2d at 400.
[The trier of fact may award punitive damages if it finds the issues in favor
of [the] plaintiff and if it believes [the] defendant published the defamatory
[statement] with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for
whether it was true or false at a time when [the] defendant had serious doubts
as to whether it was true.
Id.
89. Recall that in Herbertv: Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979), the Supreme Court noted
that inquiry into the editorial process may be necessary to prove actual malice. Id. at 160.
90. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
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performed exclusively by compensatory damages. The importance of protecting
one's good name is evidenced by the Supreme Court's traditional placement of
defamatory statements outside of the realm of First Amendment protection 9'
(although New York Times and its progeny have accorded various degrees of
First Amendment protection to certain allegedly defamatory statements).'
Therefore, when the defendant's fault is at issue, a balance exists in the abstract
between a freedom of press interest which receives limited First Amendment
protection and a freedom from speech interest which is largely free of First
Amendment obstacles.
The proper evaluation of these competing interests is not the four-factor
balancing test utilized by the Classic ! court, but rather a variation of that test.
The ClassicHI test is improper because it preliminarily favors the privilege in
that it presumes that, all things being equal, the First Amendment interests
outweigh those of a defamation plaintiff.93 Three aspects of this approach evince
this bias. First, the test presumes that alternative sources of the confidential
information exist, which thereby makes it more likely that the privilege will be
recognized. 4 Second, it makes the importance of protecting confidentiality a

91. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, (1942), the Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words ....
Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added).
92. New York Times v. Sullivan Co., 376 U.S. 254,267 (1964), requires defamation
plaintiffs who are public officials to prove actual malice in order to recover damages.
Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967), extends the New York Times
requirement to public figure-plaintiffs. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,324
(1974), prohibits states from (1) imposing liability for defamatory statements without a
showing that the defendant was at fault in publishing such a statement, (2) permitting
recovery of presumed damages without proof of actual harm or actual malice, and (3)
permitting recovery of punitive damages without a showing of actual malice.
PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986), requires that an
allegedly defamatory statement be proven false in order to recover damages against a
media defendant for speech of public concern. Milkovich v. LorainJournalCo., 497 U.S.
1, 19-20 (1990), accords allegedly defamatory statements of opinion full First
Amendment protection unless they can be demonstrated to contain provably false factual
information.
93. This author disagrees with this presumption, and alternatively submits that the
conflicting interests are equally important for the reasons previously mentioned.
94. With regard to whether alternative sources of the confidential information exist,
the ClassicIII court required "[t]he party seeking the information [to] show that his only
practical access to crucial information necessary for the development of the case is
through the newsman's source," State ex rel. Classic H, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 656
(Mo. CL App. 1997) (quoting Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 716-17 (3d Cir.
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factor relevant to the evaluation of the competing interests. The mere existence
of this factor favors recognition of the privilege, however, as there is always an
interest in protecting confidentiality. Third, the test unjustly requires plaintiffs
to refute the reporter's claims of confidentiality." Such a requirement is futile
because a plaintiff who is ignorant of the identities of a reporter's sources will
likewise beignorant of any genuine promises of confidentiality extended to such
sources.
A more appropriate balancing test would require the trial court to ultimately
determine whether compelled disclosure of a reporter's confidential sources is
necessary for a plaintiff to prove fault.96 This determination can be made by
evaluating three factors: (1) whether alternative evidence of fault exists; (2)
whether the plaintiff has made an otherwise prima facie case of defamation; and
(3) whether an extraordinary interest in protecting confidentiality exists. The
trial court's determination is to be based on the totality of the factors in light of
the circumstances of each case. In other words, the factors do not necessarily
carry equal weight, and their relative weights may fluctuate from one case to the
next.
In contrast to the Classic!!/
court's balancing approach, this test presumes
that the competing interests are equally strong in the abstract. Therefore, both
sides are required to adduce evidence without the benefit or detriment of any
underlying presumptions. If, after application of the test, the trial court
determines that fault can be proven in the absence of disclosure, or that other
factors preclude disclosure even though knowledge of the sources' identities is
necessary to prove fault, disclosure will not be compelled. However, if
disclosure is necessary to prove fault and no extraordinary reason to prohibit
disclosure exists, disclosure will be compelled and the reporter's shield privilege
will not be recognized.
This approach is more effective than that adopted and utilized by the
Classic HII court because it specifically accommodates the elements of
Missouri's defamation claim, thereby confining a court's analysis to a more
pertinent framework. Furthermore, it dispenses with the unjust requirement that
1979)), and further stated that the trial court "should not be required to make the delicate
balance of interests required by the privilege unless the [movant] first shows that he is
unable to acquire the information from another source ... ." Id. (quoting United States
v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980)). These requirements create a
presumption that the privilege will prevail unless the movants make the required showing;
the reporters are not required to show that other sources exist, at least not initially.
95. See Classic11, 954 S.W.2d at 656 ("[T]he court should evaluate whether the
claimed need for confidentiality is real, or whether, for instance, the reporter simply
automatically promised confidentiality as part of a blanket effort to stymie any future
attempt at discovery.").
96. This test requires the reporter to be a party to the lawsuit. Where a party seeks
to compel disclosure of the confidential sources of a reporter not a party to the suit, the
reporter's shield privilege should be absolute, given that nondisclosure would not be a
hindrance to a plaintiff's ability to prove the elements of a defamation claim.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/6
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a plaintiff engage in futile attempts to disprove confidentiality in order to swing
one of the factors in his favor. Finally, it places the competing interests on level
ground, and requires the adverse parties to justify why their interest should
prevail in the absence of any presumptions. Since the conflicting interests truly
are equally important in the abstract, this approach more adequately ensures that
the proper interest will prevail in light of the particular facts of a given case.97

C. The Proprietyofthe Privilege Where Faultis Not at Issue
If fault is not at issue, or if the trial court determines that disclosure is
otherwise inappropriate after weighing the competing interests, then further
attempts to ascertain those sources' identities are only relevant to the imposition
of punitive damages. When this is the case, the interests in opposition to the
recognition of the reporter's shield privilege are weakened to the point where
they can never override those in favor of the privilege. In other words, where
the sole relevance of the identity of a reporter's confidential source pertains to
the imposition ofpunitive damages, the reporter's shield privilege should always
be recognized.
The separate functions performed by compensatory and punitive damages
support this conclusion.
The tort law of libel and slander has been conceived of serving
three separate functions: (1) to compensate the plaintiff for the
injury to his reputation, for his pecuniary losses and for his
emotional distress, (2) to vindicate him and aid in restoring his
reputation and (3) to punish the defendant and dissuade him and
others from publishing defamatory statements. The traditional
remedy has been an award of damages, whether compensatory,
nominal, or punitive."
Recall that, in civil defamation proceedings, the primary interest in
opposition to the recognition of the privilege is a defamed plaintiffs right to
prosecute his claim and thereby repair undue damage to his reputation.
Compensatory damages perform this function by returning the plaintiff to the
condition he was in prior to the publication of the defamatory statement. In the
words of the Restatement (Second), compensatory damages "vindicate [the
plaintiff] and aid him in restoring his reputation," as well as "compensate... for
97. This author does not attempt to reevaluate the dispute in ClassicIII by way of
the proposed balancing test, because the court's opinion likely does not contain all
relevant facts or present all possible competing arguments. The proposed test is simply
offered as a more proper analytical device than that utilized by the Classic III court,
irrespective of whether it would yield the same result.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 623 special note (1976).
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his pecuniary losses and for his emotional distress .... "99 Punitive damages, on
the other hand, serve to "putnish the defendant and dissuade him and others from
publishing defamatory statements."'" By definition, punitive damages play no
role in restoring a defamed plaintiff's reputation; they only serve to punish the
defendant and to deter similar conduct in the future. Therefore, barring a
plaintiff from receipt of punitive damages can never interfere with his ability to
protect and restore his good name.
Two legal rules in Missouri provide further support for this notion. First,
punitive damages may be awarded only upon a showing of outrageous or
reckless conduct,' and then only in the trier-of-fact's discretion. 2 This is in
stark contrast to compensatory damages, which inure as a matter of right to a
defamed plaintiff. Second, fifty percent of "any final judgment awarding
punitive damages shall be rendered in favor of the state .... ,,03
Both rules signify that although punitive damages serve a proper role in tort
law by punishing a plaintiff whose culpability exceeds mere negligence,"° they
constitute a windfall to the plaintiff since his injuries are not repaired to any
greater extent than by compensatory damages. When a defamation plaintiff
seeks to avail himself of punitive damages, then, the sole competing interest in
opposition to the shield privilege is his desire to punish the defamer. This author
fails to see how the punishment of a wrongdoer, once the plaintiff has been made
whole via compensatory damages, could ever counterbalance "the broad societal
interest in a full and free flow of information to the public.' '1"S Hence, to engage
in any sort of balancing process is unnecessary under these circumstances and

99. Id.

100. Id.
101. "Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because
of the defendant's evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others." Burnett
v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908(2) (1979)).
102. "Punitive damages are not a matter of right but rest in the discretion of the
trier of fact." Kennedy v. Jasper, 928 S.W.2d 395, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
103. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.675(2) (1994). This award goes to the Tort Victims
Compensation Fund, with procedures for disbursement to be promulgated by the Missouri
General Assembly. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.675(1), (4) (1994). However, no such
procedures have yet been enacted.
104. There are two basic theories of punishment: utilitarianism and retributivism.
See Joshua Dressier, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 9-11 (1994). Utilitarianism posits
that the purpose of punishment is to maximize the net welfare of society, via the
deterrence of future wrongful conduct and rehabilitation of wrongdoers. Id.
Utilitarianists believe that punishment is not justified if it does not serve this end. Id.
Retributivism, on the other hand, maintains that punishment is imposed because
wrongdoers are deserving of such, irrespective of its effect on net social welfare. Id.; see
also Kennedy, 928 S.W.2d at 400 ("[P]unitive damages serve to punish an actor and deter

others from like conduct.").
105. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the reporter's shield privilege should therefore be absolute and applied without
exception.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reporter's shield privilege enables members of the media to withhold
the identities of confidential sources amid legitimate requests for such
information in grand jury, criminal, or civil proceedings. The privilege is
founded upon the free speech and free press clauses of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and similar provisions in state constitutions. Its
underlying rationale is that it ensures the free flow of information to the public
by preserving the integrity of the relationships between a reporter and his
sources. Despite the formidability of the privilege's progenitors, the privilege
itself has not been commensurately robust. For example, in Branzburgv. Hayes,
the U.S. Supreme Court subjugated the interests underlying the privilege to the
public's interest in the prevention and prosecution of crime and held that the
privilege should not be recognized in grand jury proceedings despite its First
Amendment origins. In CBS, Inc. (KMOX-TI) v. Campbell,the Eastern District
of the Missouri Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion interpreting the
Missouri Constitution. In criminal proceedings, the privilege often yields to the
defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to a fair trial
and his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses.
However, in State ex rel. ClassicHI, Inc. v. Ely, the Eastern District of theMissouri Court of Appeals recognized a qualified reporter's shield privilege in
civil defamation cases. ClassicIII requires courts to evaluate four specific
factors to determine whether the privilege should be recognized in a particular
case. This case-by-case analysis is appropriate in cases where the identities of
confidential sources are critical to the plaintiff's ability to recover compensatory
damages. Conversely, where these identities are of minimal value to the
plaintiff's ability to recover compensatory damages but remain material to an
award of punitive damages, an absolute reporter's shield privilege should exist.
RYAN S. FEHLIG
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